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Preventing Rwanda in a Rawlsian World
Gerbrand Hoogvliet
An intuitive and commonly held view of human
rights is that they are good and worth upholding because
they are good for persons. A violation of human rights
causes suffering to persons and since suffering is
intrinsically bad we should take a stand against such
violations. By making explicit the assumption that all
persons are equal we get what is usually referred to as a
Cosmopolitan View of human rights. This view suggests
that we are required to intervene in violations of human
rights on the basis of the two assumptions stated above. The
degree of intervention and the severity of the violation
necessary to warrant such an action are up for debate but all
arguments of this sort ultimately rely on a view that takes
persons as primary. Other reasons for intervention are often
of a more ad hoc variety, such as Nagel’s humanitarian
duties1, and will not be discussed in this paper.
In light of the strong appeal of the Cosmopolitan
View and the fact that it seems to be widely held (although
admittedly in a large variety of forms) it is striking that
Rawls chooses a radically different approach to the role of
human rights in international relations and rejects
Cosmopolitanism. In his Law of Peoples (LOP) he takes
Peoples rather than persons as primary and therefore ends up
with an interpretation of human rights that is no longer
grounded in persons. This version of human rights is more
1

see Thomas Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice', Philosophy
and Public Affairs 33(2005): 113-47
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instrumental in nature and serves as a guideline for the
conduct of international relations among Peoples in the
Society of Peoples.
Following Rawls’s lead in LOP, this paper shall start
by considering Rawls’s notion of human rights as part of an
ideal theory. I shall show that in order for it to be ‘political
in the right way’ it cannot be grounded in persons. I will
then go on to consider whether in the context of a non-ideal
theory Rawlsian human rights are a sufficient motivation for
intervention. I shall take the Rwandan genocide in 1994 as
the paradigm case of a preventable violation of human
rights2 and test whether the Law of Peoples could persuade
decent and liberal societies to act in such cases. I shall then
go on to argue that the primacy of Peoples in Rawls fails to
lend sufficient weight to human rights and furthermore does
not respond adequately to the nature of human rights
violations in a globalized world.
Rawls’s ideal theory starts from the perspective of
Peoples, which are different from nation states in that they
have a moral character and have by definition reasonably
just or at least decent regimes (p. 27)3. Not all states and
societies are Peoples and in fact only liberal democracies
and decent societies count as such. The word decent is used
here, as in Rawls, to indicate a society that accepts the Law
of Peoples. A detailed analysis of the concept of People lies
beyond the scope of this paper but it is important to note that
2

For an account of the Rwandan genocide and its preventability
by the international community, see Lt. General Romeo Dallaire,
Shake Hands with the Devil (New York: Carol&Graff Publishers,
2004)
3
Unless otherwise indicated, all page numbers refer to John
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1999).
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these are the primary agents in the Law of Peoples. He
arrives at this primacy by following Kant’s reasoning in
Perpetual Peace that a world government is both
undesirable and unfeasible (p. 36). Instead of an oppressive
or ineffective world government, Rawls suggests a
decentralization of power by relying on the cooperation of
Peoples. Thus Peoples - and societies in general - become
the primary agents in the Law of Peoples.
However, Rawls’s choice for the primacy of Peoples
over persons as agents with regard to human rights is also a
necessary one. In order for both liberal and non-liberal
decent Peoples to affirm human rights they must be
“political in the right way,” that is, independent of any
comprehensive doctrine (p. 81). For liberal Peoples this is
important since they respect the fact of reasonable pluralism
- the fact that different people in society hold different sets
of beliefs - and they do therefore not endorse politically any
comprehensive doctrine. Decent, non-liberal Peoples do
often have a comprehensive doctrine and it is hence
important for them that human rights do not run counter to
their comprehensive doctrine. Thus human rights must be
political in the right way so that decent Peoples can
reasonably affirm them.
For Rawls, the Cosmopolitan View, which takes
persons as primary, fails this criterion of being political in
the right way. As stated in the introduction to this paper, the
Cosmopolitan View takes persons as primary and would
thus ground human rights in their effects on persons. For
example, freedom from torture is a human right because
torture is bad for a person. However, as stated above, this
requires that one buys into the utilitarian notion that
suffering is bad and pleasure, defined as the opposite of
suffering, is good. The same view can also be supported on
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the basis of the Kant’s second categorical imperative, which
requires the treatment of humans not merely as means, a
condition clearly violated in the practice of torture. The
problem is that in both cases we would have to hold (part of)
a certain comprehensive doctrine in order to be able to
affirm human rights. This is objectionable to Rawls since it
would exclude a decent Peoples who hold a comprehensive
doctrine that is opposed to utilitarianism or Kantianism.
Human rights cannot be grounded in persons since this
requires acceptance of a part of a comprehensive doctrine
and would make them political in the wrong way.
Unable then to ground human rights in persons,
Rawls chooses to include them in the Law of Peoples which
is a set of principles agreed upon by Peoples in the second
Original Position (OP). The second OP resembles the well
known first OP that takes place between persons of the same
society behind the veil of ignorance. The second OP situates
Peoples symmetrically and fairly, as rational actors behind a
veil of ignorance which prevents them from knowing
specifics about their own situation (eg. population, land size,
natural resources etc.) (p.30). In this position the Peoples
then choose the Law of Peoples from among a list of
different formulations of the same principles. In the Law of
Peoples, human rights are based upon the Peoples’
consideration of their political conception of justice (p. 40)
rather than a conception of the good which is what motivates
choices in the first original position. To make sure that both
liberal and decent Peoples can agree to the same set of
human rights this set is rather limited compared to, for
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In
turn these human rights so determined are also used as a
necessary condition for decency. More importantly for our
present purposes, however, human rights are formulated so
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that a violation of them could justify political, economic and
ultimately military intervention in a society by liberal and
decent Peoples (p. 80).
The main importance of human rights for Rawls then
does not lie in their value for persons but in their
instrumental value for determining when intervention in an
outlaw state is justified. Their sole motivation comes from
the agreement of Peoples in the second Original Position. To
be more precise, human rights arise from the agreement of
liberal Peoples in that second OP, with the decent Peoples
later affirming the same beliefs. It is in fact the affirming of
these beliefs that makes makes them part of the Society of
Peoples, which is the community of liberal and decent
Peoples. However, the question remains as to why Peoples
in the second OP care at all about violations of human rights
in outlaw states? Since outlaw states do not accept the Law
of Peoples they are not Peoples. Considering that we take
Peoples as primary, concern about what goes on in outlaw
states can only be secondary. Furthermore, the Law of
Peoples states as its fourth principle that “Peoples are to
observe a duty of non-intervention”(p. 37). The reasons for
intervention of any kind and especially the military variety
are thus slim in Rawls’s ideal theory.
We can however construct an ideal theory view on
military intervention from the other Laws. The Law of
Peoples states that Peoples have the right to self-defense and
a duty to help burdened societies. Presumably, outlaw states
are burdened societies, but it is doubtful whether political or
economic assistance will alleviate human rights violations
within an acceptable time frame.
Within ideal theory we are then left with only one
legitimate ground for the type of military intervention that
can prevent severe human rights violations, namely the right
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to self-defense. Countries then have a right under ideal
theory to intervene in human rights violations if their own
security is at stake. This can plausibly be extended to the
stability of the Society of Peoples as well. The mandate that
ideal theory provides for intervention then is that countries
are allowed to intervene militarily if their own security or
the stability of the Society of Peoples is at stake. Put
differently: human rights violations that have international
spill-overs allow for military intervention, but atrocities
neatly and purposefully contained within the borders of an
outlaw state do not. If this is indeed the conclusion from
ideal theory I hold it to be both undesirable and morally
deplorable. It would furthermore fail to prevent the
paradigm case of genocide, Rwanda, which was almost
entirely contained within the country.
Rawls’s non-ideal theory however, provides a
somewhat more satisfactory view on nationally contained
violations of human rights. For the most part it is a
reformulation and concretization of the ideal theory from
Part II of LOP.
In the section on Just War Doctrine Rawls reasserts
that well-ordered societies can only wage war against “nonwell-ordered states whose expansionist aims threaten the
security and free institutions of well-ordered regimes and
bring about war”(p. 94). Wars are thus to be fought only on
the basis of self-defense and are never to be started. This
clearly fails to prevent any form of genocide occurring
within the borders of a state and thus fails the paradigm case
of Rwanda.
As stated before, human rights provide a criterion by
which intervention can be justified. Rawls elaborates most
on this idea in a footnote to the section on Just War
Doctrine. Because this passage is essential in constructing
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Rawls’s position vis-a-vis human rights I will quote it at
length:
“Earlier I said that we must at some point ask
the question whether it is ever legitimate to
interfere with outlaw states simply because
they violate human rights, even though they
are not dangerous and aggressive towards
other states[...] Certainly there is a prima
facie case for intervention of some kind in
such cases, yet one must proceed differently
with advanced civilizations than with
primitive societies. Primitive, isolated
societies [...] we really have no way to
influence. [Advanced societies] must be made
to realize that without human rights, their
participation in a system of social cooperation
is simply impossible.[...] Is there ever a time
when forceful intervention might be called
for? If the offenses are egregious and the
society does not respond to sanctions, such
intervention in the defense of human rights
would be acceptable and would be called for”
(p. 93-94)
Rawls thus does, although hesitantly, endorse military
intervention. The idea is that Peoples will first exert
diplomatic, political and economic pressure on an outlaw
state to get them to bring these violations to an end. Only if
all of these methods fail is a military intervention called for.
Although many theories of international relations call
for intervention in defense of human rights, only very few
have been able to motivate nations to actually do so. I will
thus turn my focus to the implications of Rawl’s non-ideal
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theory and its ability to motivate Peoples to intervene
militarily in outlaw states.
As stated before, Rawls’s notion of human rights in
the context of international relations is limited. One of the
reasons for this is that human rights play an instrumental
role in LOP. They define a necessary condition for decency
and a criterion, as mentioned above, for intervention. It can
thus be argued that they are fundamentally instrumental and
their importance is almost entirely contingent on the role
they play within the theory. In fact if it were otherwise they
would be political in the wrong way.
If this criticism stands it has serious implications for
LOP. It is important to emphasize the degree of motivation
and determination it takes for a People to put its soldiers in
harm’s way for the benefit of persons with whom they have
no particular relationship. After all, they are coming to the
aid of citizens of an outlaw state, and since outlaw states
aren’t Peoples it is unclear to what extent their citizens
would affirm the Law of Peoples. There is thus no promise
of reciprocity which in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice serves as
one of the key motivating factors in helping others.
Considering the high degree of required motivation it
is doubtful whether a merely instrumental version of human
rights will be capable of persuading Peoples to intervene
when these rights are being violated.
This criticism of Rawls, however, does not
accurately reflect the nature of human rights in LOP.
Although it is true that the role of human rights is almost
entirely an instrumental one, its origins are normative. This
can be seen in the section on human rights where Rawls
claims that “the violation of this class of rights is equally
condemned by both reasonable liberal peoples and decent
hierarchical peoples”(p. 79). This suggests that the concept
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of human rights does have moral content and thus carries
more motivational weight.
However, if we analyze further the origins of this
importance of human rights we encounter a problem. The
most logical way of thinking about the way in which human
rights originate from the moral ideas of liberal and decent
Peoples, is that they are based on a wide-spread sentiment
within society that the violation of human rights is bad for
persons. As I have shown above, however, this requires the
acceptance of part of a comprehensive doctrine, which is
fine for individual persons but prevents it from becoming
part of the outcome of an original position. Unable then still,
to ground the importance of human rights in their effect on
persons, we are forced to conclude that human rights are
important in and of themselves. Indeed, this is what Rawls
seems to suggest as well in the quote above when he states
that “intervention in the defense of human rights would be
acceptable and would be called for (emphasis mine)” (p. 94).
We intervene in defense of human rights, not in defense of
the persons suffering their violations.
Contrasting this view of the importance of human
rights with the importance of persons as expressed by the
Cosmopolitan View I think the latter has a stronger appeal
and ability to motivate. In fact I strongly doubt whether the
Rawlsian view can provide sufficient motivation for
intervention at all. In light of this I think one ought to prefer
the Cosmopolitan View which, though certainly not shared
by everyone, provides sufficient motivation to a sufficient
number of nations to intervene and bring an end to atrocities
in outlaw states. A theory of international relations that
seems unable to prevent genocides such as the one in
Rwanda can hardly be an improvement of the current
situation.
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A possible response for Rawls to this critique is that
like the basic structure in A Theory of Justice, people, or in
this case Peoples, will over time grow affectionate towards
the global basic structure and its rules and will come to see
them as valuable. Hence they would over time be willing to
put the lives of their citizens at risk in military operations
aimed at defending human rights. The effectiveness of this
response is dubitable since it remains unclear to what extent
Rawls really establishes a basic structure for global
interaction. In fact, the views expressed in LOP are largely
based on the non-existence of such a basic structure on the
international level. It is thus unclear if there is a sufficient
basic structure in the Society of Peoples towards which
persons could feel affection. It is consequently doubtful that
such an affection can arise at all, leaving us again with a
theory that lacks motivational weight.
I think there is nevertheless a broader problem with
the ability of the Law of Peoples to effectively regulate
international politics in order to bring about a better world.
This problem is expressed by Allen Buchanan in his paper
Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian
World4 in which he argues that LOP fails to take into
account the complexities and intricacies of the modern
world. Although Buchanan’s criticism applies to the whole
of LOP, I shall here focus on its implications for Rawls’s
view of human rights and humanitarian intervention. I shall
argue that Buchanan’s criticism points in the same direction
as the objections raised earlier in this paper, namely that the
weakness of Law of Peoples lies in the fact it that takes
nations or Peoples as primary.
4

Allen Buchanan, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished
Westphalian World’, Ethics 110(July 2000): 697–721
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As Buchanan points out, dividing up the world in
Peoples and defining all international interaction in terms of
Peoples fails to capture the reality of the modern globalized
world. In the world we live in today, cross-border
interactions on a non-governmental level are pervasive and
no ideal theory can legitimately choose to ignore this. The
importance of non-governmental actors in global politics
poses challenges to governments to which any theory of
international relations should strive to formulate answers.
Specifically, the governments of outlaw states - or
governments of any state for that matter - no longer have a
monopoly on the violation of human rights. In fact, the
responsibility lies increasingly with militia groups that
operate within countries or across borders. To be sure,
Rawls is correct in choosing governments as those who
should follow the Law of Peoples in acting on the global
stage, but he is wrong in identifying other governments as
the only parties affected by such actions. The field of
international relations deals with what governments ought to
do, but should not limit itself to interactions between
governments as this would exclude many dimensions of
modern politics. However, the theory expressed in LOP is
even harder to apply when we take into account all these
intricacies. For example, a militia perpetrating crimes
against humanity within the border of a single country
would not be a proper target for applying political and
diplomatic pressure since these militias do not operate on the
government level. It is difficult to determine if Rawls thinks
we could intervene at all in such a situation where violations
are not sanctioned by the government. But if we are capable
of responding, then within the framework of the Law of
Peoples we are left with only two options: to do nothing or
to intervene militarily. Any of the other measures suggested
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by Rawls requires a government with which to interact. This
seems problematic to me and although many of these
objections can be probably be answered through ad hoc
extrapolations of the Law of Peoples, the problem remains
that taking Peoples as primary does not correspond to reality
and as a consequence fails to accurately address many of the
current political issues such as human rights violations.
A Cosmopolitan View on the other hand that takes
persons as primary, also recognizes any form of organization
between these persons, not just the nation state. It thus
provides a blueprint for international relations which
responds to the dynamic nature of associations among
persons and does not run into the problem of defining the
proper agents to whom actions should be directed.
Furthermore, since it takes persons as primary, human rights
get a more solid grounding in their value as being beneficial
to persons. The Cosmopolitan View thus yields a theory in
which governments can address their actions to any
organization of persons, both nationally and across borders,
and intervene in violations of human rights on the basis of
alleviating the suffering of persons. Certainly, this view
needs to be elaborated further to determine its ultimate
viability as a rule for conducting international politics.
However taking persons as the starting point of a theory
allows us to respond better to the problems of a globalized
world and gives us a more satisfactory and intuitive
understanding of the nature of human rights. I think Rawls’s
concern for the neutrality of any principles of international
politics is an important one and the necessity of accepting
part of a comprehensive doctrine in order to be able to
endorse the Cosmopolitan View is a troubling notion. In fact
it may prove to be the case that the group of nations willing
to support the Cosmopolitan View is much smaller than the
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Society of Peoples envisioned by Rawls. However, given the
choice between a theory of foreign relations that is
acceptable to all Peoples but fails to make a strong stand
against human rights violations and furthermore does not
resemble today’s political reality, or a more normative view
that does provide the necessary motivation to intervene on
behalf of the victims of slavery, torture and genocide, I
choose the latter. This may leave us with a view acceptable
to fewer nations, but a more meaningful guideline for those
who do accept it.
Rawls’s Law of Peoples does call on liberal and
decent Peoples to intervene in human rights violations such
as the Rwandan genocide. However, since its notion of
human rights is not grounded in persons it fails to supply the
necessary persuasive strength to motivate Peoples to bring
about such an intervention. Furthermore, the fact that Law of
Peoples takes persons as primary means it cannot respond
adequately to the intricacies and challenges of a globalized
world. Because both these problems originate from a focus
on Peoples rather than persons I argue that today’s
governments are better served with a political theory that
takes persons as primary. The Cosmopolitan View currently
seems to be the best candidate for such a theory but in
pursuit of a person-affecting theory of international politics
better candidates may yet be revealed.

